Abstract This study examined whether individuals with social anxiety disorder have a memory bias for bodily sensations associated with anxiety. Using a false feedback paradigm, 33 individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) and 34 non-anxious control (NAC) participants completed a performance task while monitoring stimuli they were told provided feedback on whether their physiological response was changing or stable. On measures of free recall and recognition for their feedback no differences were found between SAD and NAC individuals. However, among SAD participants only, fear of bodily sensations was significantly associated with enhanced memory for stimuli associated with physiological responses. Results suggest that research and treatment may benefit from considering not only fear of social situations, but also the focus of those fears, such as bodily sensations, when examining memory biases in social anxiety.
Introduction
Cognitive models hypothesize that individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) will exhibit enhanced memory for social threat information (Clark and Wells 1995; Rapee and Heimberg 1997) . However, most studies using social threat word stimuli have been unsuccessful in detecting memory biases in SAD (Cloitre et al. 1995; Foa et al. 1989; Rapee et al. 1994) . The few studies which have found evidence for a memory bias in social anxiety have done so for negative public self-referent information (O'Banion and Arkowitz 1977) , particularly under conditions of social evaluation (Breck and Smith 1983; Smith et al. 1983 ). Some studies have used more ecologically valid stimuli, such as critical or angry faces (Coles and Heimberg 2005; Foa et al. 2000; Lundh and Ö st 1996a, b; Pérèz-López and Woody 2001) . Though a subset of these studies have found evidence of a memory bias among individuals with social anxiety (Foa et al. 2000; Lundh and Ö st 1996a) , several others have failed to find such evidence (Coles and Heimberg 2005; Lundh and Ö st 1996b; Pérèz-López and Woody 2001) .
Other researchers have assessed memory for social interactions using both vignettes and real interactions (Brendle and Wenzel 2004; Daly et al. 1989; Kimble and Zehr 1982; Mellings and Alden 2000; Stopa and Clark 1993; Wenzel et al. 2005 ). Brendle and Wenzel (2004) failed to demonstrate that social anxiety was associated with enhanced recall of negative evaluative information presented in vignettes depicting prototypical social situations and subsequently replicated this finding using videotaped social situations (Wenzel et al. 2005) . Some studies have demonstrated that individuals with high levels of social anxiety remember fewer details of a social interaction compared to non-anxious controls (Daly et al. 1989; Kimble and Zehr 1982; Mellings and Alden 2000; Stopa and Clark 1993) . These researchers have interpreted these findings as suggesting that individuals with social anxiety direct their attention inward towards internal aspects of the self, such as thoughts and bodily sensations, rather than to external aspects of the social situation.
The prediction that social anxiety is associated with enhanced memory for external social threat information has generally not been supported. Studies with positive findings have used self-referent stimuli (Breck and Smith 1983; O'Banion and Arkowitz 1977; Smith et al. 1983) , whereas most with negative findings have used general social threat stimuli (Cloitre et al. 1995; Foa et al. 1989; Rapee et al. 1994) . Null findings for a memory bias in social anxiety for external social threat combined with research finding evidence for memory biases for self-referent information suggest that memory biases in social anxiety may be for information about the self in social situations.
This idea is consistent with another prediction of cognitive models of social anxiety-the tendency for socially anxious individuals to direct attention internally towards thoughts, beliefs and bodily sensations (Clark and Wells 1995; Rapee and Heimberg 1997 ). These models propose that when a feared social situation is encountered, individuals with SAD form a mental image of how they believe they appear to their audience, which is then used as an indicator of their performance. When discussed as a trait variable, this process of directing attention inward is referred as self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al. 1975) and when discussed as a state variable, it is referred to as selffocused attention (e.g., Woody 1996) .
Consistent with the predictions of cognitive models, individuals with SAD report greater levels of public selfconsciousness, the tendency to direct attention towards observable aspects of the self (Fenigstein et al. 1975; Hope and Heimberg 1988; Jostes et al. 1999; Lundh and Ö st 1996c; Saboonchi et al. 1999) . When self-focused attention is experimentally induced, individuals with SAD exhibit enhanced concern over the impression they will leave (Alden et al. 1992 ) and report increased anxiety (Woody 1996; Woody and Rodriguez 2000) . Among individuals without SAD, experimentally induced self-focused attention results in increased concern over rejection (Fenigstein 1979) , suggesting that self-focused attention may play a causal role in the maintenance of social anxiety.
Consistent with evidence suggesting that social anxiety is associated with enhanced attention towards aspects of the self, two recent studies have found that individuals high in social anxiety exhibit attentional biases towards cues of internal arousal versus cues of external social threat (Mansell et al. 2003; Pineles and Mineka 2005) . Mansell et al. (2003) found that under conditions of anticipated social threat, speech anxious individuals exhibited faster responses to cues of internal arousal rather than an external probe, compared to non-anxious individuals. These findings were replicated by Pineles and Mineka (2005) using visual signals (rather than tactile signals) representing arousal.
The presence of enhanced attention towards internal cues of arousal in social anxiety may explain why researchers have generally been unsuccessful in detecting memory biases for external social threats. If individuals are directing their attention towards the self, it is likely that they are not directing their attention towards external cues of social threat, such as critical faces, and therefore do not encode that information (or do not encode it well). If memory biases do exist in social anxiety it is likely that they exist for the information that individuals with social anxiety are attending to, that is their thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations.
In a previous study, we attempted to examine if memory for internal bodily sensations of arousal is enhanced if one believes that physiological response is important to performance (Ashbaugh and Radomsky 2009) . In that study, students who were asked to give a speech were told either that changes in physiology were indicative of poor performance (High Importance Group), or that changes in physiology were unrelated to their performance (Low Importance Group). During the task, participants were led to believe that their physiology was being recorded and were asked to monitor their physiology via feedback in the form of images on a computer screen indicating whether their physiology was increasing, decreasing, or remaining stable. After completion of the speech, participants were asked using free recall and recognition tasks to remember the images they saw during their speech. Participants in the High Importance Group recalled and recognized more images overall than participants in the Low Importance Group. Furthermore, participants reporting high social anxiety recognized more images associated with increasing physiology if they were in the High Importance Group compared to the Low Importance Group. In contrast, participants reporting low social anxiety were more accurate in recognizing images associated with a stable physiological response if they were in the High Importance Group compared to the Low Importance Group. These latter results in particular suggest that the level of social anxiety in combination with beliefs about the meaning of one's physiology response during a performance task determine what aspects of one's physiology response is remembered following a performance task.
However, there were a number of challenges and limitations of this study. First, a non-clinical sample was used and thus findings could not be extended to individuals with SAD. Second, recall and recognition rates were relatively low and may have reduced the power of the study. We speculated that this may have been due to the fact that participants passively observed their physiological feedback (Ashbaugh and Radomsky 2009) .
The current study is an attempt to rectify some of these limitations and to test the hypothesis that individuals with Cogn Ther Res (2011) 35:304-316 305 SAD will have a memory bias for their perception of internal physiological sensations. Individuals with and without SAD engaged in a similar performance task to the one used by Ashbaugh and Radomsky (2009) ; however, to encourage encoding of the false feedback, the feedback information received was in the form of neutral words and participants were asked to pronounce each word as a performance task. Participants were asked to complete a video-taped word pronunciation performance task as they monitored their physiology. They were told that if the word appears on one side of the computer screen, it indicates that their physiology is changing, whereas if it appears on the opposite side of the screen it indicates that their physiology is stable. After completing the task, participants were subsequently asked to recall and recognize the words they had seen. We predicted that SAD participants would remember more stimuli associated with the perception of changing physiology compared to non-anxious participants.
Method

Participants
Participants included individuals diagnosed with SAD (n = 40) and undergraduate students from Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec (n = 42), who served as a non-anxious control group (NAC). Participants were recruited via advertisements in local newspapers for SAD participants, and via notices posted around the university campus as well as announcements made in classes for NAC participants. To attempt to match the two groups on age, students over the age of 30 were particularly encouraged to participate during recruitment. Exclusion criteria included current reports of psychosis, or a current diagnosis of bipolar or panic disorder. (Participants meeting criteria for panic disorder were excluded as the cognitive model of panic suggests that these individuals catastrophically misinterpret their bodily sensations (Clark 1986) , and as a result, a current diagnosis of panic disorder could potentially confound results of the current study.) All participants provided informed consent for study procedures at the beginning of the study. As deception was involved in the study, at the end of the study participants were informed of the true nature of the study and given the opportunity to withdraw consent to have their information included in analyses. No participant withdrew consent. Participants received either cash remuneration, partial credit towards their classes or had their name entered in a draw for cash prizes in exchange for participating. Participants were excluded if they indicated that they did not at all believe their physiology was being monitored (SAD n = 1; NAC n = 1) or they did not learn how to correctly monitor their physiology (SAD n = 6; NAC n = 7; see section entitled Manipulation Check for more information). After excluding these participants, there were 33 individuals in the SAD group and 34 individuals in the NAC group. The average age of SAD participants was 34.70 (SD = 11.89) and 64% were female. The average age of NAC participants was 29.53 (SD = 11.59) and 62% were female. There were no significant differences in age, t (65) = -1.80, p = .08, d = .45, or gender, v 2 (1) = .025, p = .87, between the groups. There was also no significant difference between the groups with regard to highest level of education attained, U = 468.00, p = .30. Among SAD participants the distribution of highest level of education attained was as follows: 3% elementary school, 24% high school, 21% pre-university college, 1 51% university. Among NAC participants the distribution of highest level of education attained was as follows: 21% high school, 51% pre-university college, 27% university. Data concerning highest level of education attained was missing for one NAC participant.
Diagnoses were assessed with the anxiety disorders interview schedule-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown et al. 1994) . Individuals in the NAC group did not meet criteria for any DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association 2000) disorder assessed in the ADIS-IV, including major depressive disorder, dysthymia, bipolar disorder, all anxiety disorders, hypochondriasis, and psychosis. In the SAD group, the mean ADIS-IV severity score for SAD was 4.70 (range 4-6; SD = .81), indicating mild symptom severity. For all but three participants in the SAD group, SAD was the primary diagnosis. Primary diagnoses for the remaining participants were depression, generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Participants reported an average of 7.48 (SD = 2.05) feared situations with a range from 3 to 11 feared situations. Thus most SAD participants in this study met criteria for the generalized subtype. Among SAD participants 21.2% received one additional diagnosis, 30.3% received two additional diagnoses, and 3% received three additional diagnoses. Six met criteria for GAD, 7 for obsessivecompulsive disorder, 3 for PTSD, 6 for depression, 1 for substance dependence without physiological dependence and 1 for substance dependence without physiological dependence in sustained partial remission. Participants meeting criteria for substance dependence agreed not to use the substance(s) on the evening before or day of the experiment.
Participants were included if they were currently taking medications, though they were required to be stabilized on the same dosage for at least 1 month prior to participating in the study. Among the SAD participants, 27.3% reported currently taking a psychotropic medication. Medications included selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (n = 4), tricyclic antidepressants (n = 1), other types of antidepressants (n = 2), and benzodiazepines (n = 2). Among the NAC group, 2 participants also reported taking psychotropic medication. One was prescribed an anti-psychotic drug and the other a benzodiazepine.
Measures
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown et al. 1994) The ADIS-IV is a semi-structured interview that assesses for the presence of anxiety and mood disorders using DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association 2000) criteria. For each diagnostic category a dimensional rating from 0 (none) to 8 (very severely disturbing/disabling) is given at the end of each subsection. Scores greater than 4 indicate that the problem causes significant distress or interference and that all DSM-IV criteria are met to warrant a diagnosis. The ADIS-IV has demonstrated good to excellent interrater reliability for all categories except for dysthymia (Brown et al. 2001) . The interview was administered by doctoral level students trained to administer the ADIS-IV.
Social Phobia Scale (SPS) and Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick and Clarke 1998)
The SPS and SIAS are 20-item self-report questionnaires assessing the fear of being observed by others and social interaction anxiety, respectively. Scores greater than 24 on the SPS or greater than 34 on the SIAS are suggestive of SAD (Heimberg et al. 1992 ). Both scales have exhibited excellent internal consistency, (as [ .85) (Heimberg et al. 1992; Mattick and Clarke 1998; Osman et al. 1998) , testretest reliability (Mattick and Clarke 1998) , and convergent and divergent validity in clinical and non-clinical samples (Heimberg et al. 1992; Mattick and Clarke 1998) . Additionally, the SPS and the SIAS have been shown to effectively discriminate those with SAD from those without SAD (Brown et al. 1997; Mattick and Clarke 1998; Peters 2000) .
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al. 1996) The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report measure assessing cognitive, affective, and somatic symptoms of depression. The scale has exhibited acceptable internal consistency (as [ .89) (Beck et al. 1996; Carmody 2005; Dozois et al. 1998; Osman et al. 1997; Wiebe and Penley 2005) , testretest reliability (Beck et al. 1996; Wiebe and Penley 2005) , as well as acceptable convergent and divergent validity (Beck et al. 1996; Osman et al. 1997 ) in clinical and non-clinical samples.
Body Sensations Questionnaire (BSQ; Chambless et al. 1984) The BSQ is a 17-item self-report questionnaire assessing concern and preoccupation with autonomic arousal. A total score is calculated by averaging the 17 individual items, thus scores can range from 1 to 5. The scale has exhibited acceptable internal consistency (a = .87) and 1-month test-retest reliability among a sample of individuals with agoraphobia (Chambless et al. 1984) . The scale has also exhibited acceptable convergent and divergent validity (Chambless et al. 1984) . Research also suggests that this scale is appropriate for use among individuals with other anxiety disorders beyond agoraphobia (Zgourides et al. 1989) . The BSQ was used as a measure of fear of bodily sensations rather than the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Reiss et al. 1986 ) because items simply assess fears of bodily sensations whereas the ASI also includes wording within the items related to beliefs about the meaning of some sensations (e.g., ''When I notice my heart is beating rapidly, I worry that I might have a heart attack'') that are likely to be more relevant to panic disorder than SAD.
Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS)
Participants were asked to rate how happy, angry, anxious, and depressed they were feeling at the present moment using a 100 mm visual analog scale (VAS) from 0 (I do not feel at all X) to 100 (I feel extremely X) for each emotion at baseline, just prior to, and just after the word pronunciation task. Only ratings of anxiety were analyzed; the other emotion ratings were used as filler items.
Performance Ratings
Participants were asked to rate how accurate, clear, expressive and likeable they anticipated appearing from 0 (not at all) to 100 (completely) just prior to the word pronunciation task. They were also asked to make selfevaluations of these variables using the same rating scale just after completing the word pronunciation task.
Manipulation Check
At the end of the study participants were asked to rate, using a 100 mm VAS, the degree to which they believed the computer was measuring their physiology from 0 (completely believed) to 100 (did not believe at all). Participants who did not at all believe the computer was measuring their performance, by circling 100 on the VAS, were excluded. They were also asked using a 100 mm VAS the degree to which they believed that their physiology was a good indicator of their performance from 0 (physiology reflected my performance) to 100 (physiology was unrelated to my performance). To ensure that participants correctly learned how to monitor their physiology based upon the location of the words on the computer screen during the word pronunciation task, participants were asked whether words on the left indicated their physiology was stable, changing, or unrelated to their performance. Participants who answered incorrectly were excluded.
Word Stimuli
A total of 60 nouns were selected from the Toronto Word List (Friendly et al. 1982) for use during the word pronunciation and the recognition tasks. The Toronto Word List contains 1,080 nouns that are rated for frequency, imagery, and concreteness in the English language. Words with the 20 highest and 20 lowest rankings of frequency, imagery, and concreteness were eliminated from the word list. Words that were shorter than 5 letters were also eliminated. Additionally, all nouns from the Toronto Word List were screened by nine individuals from the Fear and Anxiety Disorders Lab at Concordia University, who are familiar with stimuli that may appear threatening to someone with an anxiety disorder, particularly SAD. Any word identified as potentially threatening (e.g., ''speech'', ''party'' and ''needle'') was eliminated from the word list. From the remaining words, 60 were randomly selected; 30 words were used for the word pronunciation task and 30 words were used as lures during the recognition test. All words were matched for word frequency, imagery and concreteness. Examples of words used include ''figure'', ''basket'', ''silver'', and ''province''.
Procedure
Participants were told that the study examines whether performance on a word pronunciation task improves if one knows how his/her physiology is responding. Participants were told word pronunciation is an important part of giving a good speech and that changes in physiology increase the likelihood of word mispronunciation. After being informed of the study purpose, baseline SUDS were taken and participants were administered the ADIS-IV.
Task Training Phase
After completing the interview, participants were seated in front of a computer. All experimental tasks (with the exception of questionnaire completion) were completed on the computer using SuperLab Pro V 2.0.4 (Cedrus Corporation 2003) software.
During the training phase, the operation of the computer was demonstrated to participants. Participants were asked to focus on a ? that appeared in the centre of the screen. The ? appeared for 1,000 ms, and was subsequently replaced by a colored triangle that appeared either on the left (3.5 in. (40.64 cm) screen. Participants were asked to press ''F'' on the keyboard whenever the triangle appeared on the left and ''J'' on the keyboard whenever it appeared on the right, and then to name the color of the triangle. These keys were chosen because they are distinguished by raised marks, corresponding to the placement of the left and right index finger when touch typing. After completing 6 training trails, during which half the triangles appeared on the left and half appeared on the right, the experimenter verified that participants understood the computer task before continuing on to the next phase of the study.
Physiology Monitoring Training
Following the task training phase, participants were connected to physiology monitoring equipment. TD-142G vinyl disposable electrodes were attached to the inner elbow of each arm and a Velcro electrode cuff was attached to the left ring finger of participants. Participants were told that the electrodes attached to the arm measured heart rate fluctuation and the electrode attached to the finger measured sweating. A Panasonic video camera was mounted directly on top of the computer monitor facing the participant and a computer microphone was placed just to the left of the monitor. Participants were told that the camera would measure ''jerky awkward movements,'' and that the microphone would measure fluctuations in voice quality. A webcam was mounted on top of the computer monitor and participants were told that it was an infra-red camera that would measure how much heat was coming off their body, ''a good measure of how much [they were] blushing.'' Participants were told that the equipment would monitor their physiology and that they would receive feedback as to whether their physiology was changing or not changing. At no point in time during the experiment was the physiology of participants ever measured. Participants were told that when the stimuli appears on one side of the screen (e.g., left) it indicates that their physiology is changing and when it appears on the other side of the screen (e.g., right) it indicates that it is stable. The location of stimuli associated with changing and stable physiology was counterbalanced across participants.
Participants then completed a practice exercise to help them better remember how to monitor their physiology. The practice exercise was the same as the training task, except that participants were also asked to say out loud whether their physiology was changing or stable based on feedback from the computer. To increase the believability of the physiology manipulation, the practice exercise was completed under two conditions; while sitting quietly when 5 out of 6 of the triangles appeared in the location associated with stable physiology, and after having jogged on the spot for 30 s when 5 of out 6 of the triangles appeared in the location associated with changing physiology.
Word Pronunciation Task
Just prior to completing the word pronunciation task, participants were reminded of the supposed purpose of the experiment. To increase the level of threat provoked by the word pronunciation task, participants were also told that their performance was being videotaped and would be shown to a psychologist and a linguist at a later date who would evaluate their performance. In reality, though the task was video-taped, the recordings were erased after each testing session. Just prior to beginning the task, participants provided SUDS ratings and rated how well they thought they would perform using the performance ratings described earlier.
During the word pronunciation task, participants saw 30 words in total, half of which were randomly assigned to appear on the left, with remaining words appearing on the right. As soon as they detected the word, participants were asked to indicate if the word appeared on the left or the right by pressing ''F'' or ''J'' respectively, and then to say the word to the camera. Reaction time (RT) between the word appearing on the screen and participants pressing the key was measured. No more than two words in a row appeared on the same side consecutively.
After completing the word pronunciation task, participants once again provided SUDS ratings and rated their perceived performance using the performance ratings. Participants were then given a 3 min distraction task consisting of a series of simple math problems to ensure that study words were not held in working memory.
Memory Assessment
Participants were told that they would be completing two more word pronunciation tasks and although their performance was still being evaluated and their physiology would continue to be monitored, they would no longer receive feedback on how their physiology was responding.
Free recall. Participants were asked to recall and say out-loud to the video camera as many of the words they saw during the first task as possible. Participants were then given 3 min to recall as many words as possible. At the end of 3 min, participants were asked to rate how confident they were that they were correct from 0 (not at all confident) to 100 (completely confident) for each word they said.
Recognition. Participants were then shown 60 consecutive words on the computer appearing in the center of the screen. Half of the words were from the word pronunciation task, while remaining words had not been seen during the experiment. No more than three words in a row were targets or lures and no more than two consecutive words were targets that had appeared on the left or the right. Participants were asked to indicate by pressing a key on the keyboard if the word was new (''N'' key), old and appeared on the left (''F'' key), or old and appeared on the right (''J'' key). They were then asked to say the word to the camera.
Once the recognition task was completed participants were disconnected from the equipment and completed questionnaire packages which included the SPS, SIAS, BDI-II, and BSQ. Finally, participants answered the manipulation check questions and were debriefed concerning the true nature of the study.
Statistical Analyses
The percentage of correctly recalled words associated with changing and stable physiology were calculated, as were the percentages of hits and false alarms during the recognition task. Hit rates were calculated as the percentage of items correctly recognized (e.g., described as old) regardless of whether they correctly remembered the location of the word (e.g., whether it appeared on the left or right). False alarms were calculated as the percentage of new items participants said appeared on the left or right. Because hit and false alarm rates do not adequately distinguish memory accuracy from response bias, signal detection theory was used. d 0 , a measure of sensitivity, reflects the degree of overlap between distribution of signal (e.g., responses to old items) and noise (e.g., the responses to new items) measured in standard deviation units (MacMillan and Creelman 2005; Stanislaw and Todorov 1999) . Criterion c was used as a measure of response bias. It reflects the distance, measured in standard deviations, between the neutral point (where the signal and noise distributions intersect) and the response criterion set by the participant. Positive values of c reflect a tendency to say an item was new (e.g., they had not seen it before) and negative values reflect the tendency to say an item was old (e.g., they had seen it before). Criterion c was chosen as a measure of response bias because it is less affected by changes in d 0 compared to other measures of response bias (MacMillan and Creelman 2005; Stanislaw and Todorov 1999). d 0 and c were calculated using the formulas described by Sorkin (1999) . Because d 0 and c cannot be calculated when hit or false alarm rates are equal to 0 or 1, log linear adjustments, which have been shown to yield less biased results than other adjustment methods (Miller 1996) , were used to calculate hit and false alarm rates.
To examine differences between groups as a function of the type of variable, repeated-measures ANOVAs with group (SAD vs. NAC) and variable type (change vs. stable word) as a within-participant factors were calculated for the percentage of items correctly recalled, as well as the hit and false alarm rates, and d 0 and c for recognition.
Results
Psychopathology
Independent t-tests revealed that SAD participants scored significantly higher on the SPS, t (62) = -9.94, p \ .001, d = 2.52, the SIAS, t (61) = -9.27, p \ .001, d = 2.37, the BDI-II, t (64) = -4.71, p \ .001, d = 1.18, and the BSQ, t (64) = -3.99, p \ .001, d = 1.00. Participants' scores are presented in Table 1 .
Manipulation Check
There was no significant difference between SAD and NAC participants in the degree to which they believed the computer was measuring their physiology, t (65) = 1.03, p = .31, d = .26. In general both SAD (M = 27.58, SD = 24.77) and NAC (M = 34.74, SD = 31.57) participants moderately believed that the computer was measuring their physiology, as on the 0-100 VAS used, lower scores reflect greater belief that the computer was measuring their physiology.. There was also no significant difference between SAD and NAC participants in the degree to which they thought that their physiology might be a good indicator of their performance, t (65) = 1.17, p = .25, d = .29. In general both SAD (M = 23.58, SD = 19.69) and NAC (M = 29.26, SD = 20.06) participants moderately believed that their physiology would be a good indicator of their performance as on the 0-100 VAS used, lower scores reflect greater belief that physiology is a good indicator of performance.
Anxiety and Perceived Performance During Word Pronunciation Task
To examine the effect of the word pronunciation task on anxiety and beliefs about performance we examined anxiety SUDS and performance measures prior to and after the task. For anxiety, a group (SAD vs. NAC) 9 time (baseline vs. pre-task vs. post-task) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that SAD participants (M = 55.01, SD = 24.71) reported significantly more state anxiety than NAC participants (M = 34.22, SD = 23.50), F (1, 64) = 23.19, p \ .001, g p 2 = .27. The main effect of time was also significant, F (2, 128) = 10.94, p \ .001, g p 2 = .15. Pairwise comparisons show that anxiety was significantly greater at pre-task (M = 48.61, SD = 26.58) than at baseline (M = 41.62, SD = 28.19) or post-task (M = 36.56, SD = 26.17). The group x time interaction was not significant, F (2, 128) = .17, p = .85, g p 2 = .003. For performance perception, a group (SAD vs. NAC) 9 time (anticipated vs. perceived) MANOVA with ratings of accuracy, clarity, expressiveness, and likeability as the dependent variables revealed a main effect for group, F (4, 62) = 7.45, p \ .001, g p 2 = .33, and time, F (4, 62) = 5.07, p \ .001, g p 2 = .25, but no group x time interaction, F (4, 62) = 1.15, p = .34, g p 2 = .07. Univariate repeated measures ANOVAs demonstrated that compared to perceived ratings, anticipatory ratings were significantly lower for accuracy, F (1, 65) = 13.36, p \ .001, g p 2 = .17, and significantly higher for how likeable participants thought they were, F (1, 65) = 6.76, p \ .05, g p 2 = .09. There was a trend for participants to also give lower ratings for how clear, F (1, 65) = 3.26, p = .08, g p 2 = .05, and higher ratings for how expressive, F (1, 65) = 3.40, p = .07, g p 2 = .05 they were, when anticipating their performance prior to the task compared to their perception of their performance after the task. That is, on some performance measures participants under-anticipated their performance (Mattick and Clarke 1998) b Social interaction anxiety scale (Mattick and Clarke 1998) c Beck depression inventory-II (Beck et al. 1996) d Body sensations questionnaire (Chambless et al. 1984) (e.g., accurate, clear), whereas on other measures they over-anticipated their performance (e.g., likeable, expressive). SAD participants rated themselves as significantly less accurate, F (1, 65) = 9.26, p \ .01, g p 2 = .13, clear, F (1, 65) = 16.45, p \ .001, g p 2 = .20, expressive, F (1, 65) = 9.06, p \ .01, g p 2 = .12, and likable, F (1, 65) = 21.62, p \ .001, g p 2 = .25, overall compared to NAC participants. Results are presented in Table 2 .
Reaction Time During the Word Pronunciation Task
A group (SAD vs. NAC) 9 variable (change vs. stable words) repeated measures ANOVA revealed that SAD participants responded significantly slower than NAC participants during the word pronunciation task, F (1, 64) = 8.35, p \ .01, g p 2 = .12. There was no main effect for variable, F (1, 64) = .70, p = .41, g p 2 = .01, however there was a significant group 9 variable interaction, F (91, 64) = 5.74, p \ .05, g p 2 = .08. Pairwise comparisons demonstrate that participants in the SAD group responded significantly more slowly to words associated with changing physiology (M = 1,330.42 ms, SD = 506.80 ms) compared to words associated with stable physiology (M = 1,237.69 ms, SD = 473.03 ms), F (1, 64) = 5.08, p \ .05, g p 2 = .07, whereas there was no significant difference in the NAC group with regard to reaction time for words associated with changing (M = 935.94 ms, SD = 442.52 ms) or stable (M = 980.59 ms, SD = 467.48 ms), physiology, F (1, 64) = 1.25, p = .27, g p 2 = .02.
Memory
Free Recall
All memory-related results are presented in Table 3 . For the percentage of items recalled, a group 9 variable repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effects for group, F (1, 65) = .17, p = .68, g p 2 = .003, variable, F (1, 65) = .34, p = .56, g p 2 = .01, nor a significant group 9 variable interaction, F (1, 65) = .006, p = .94, g p 2 \ .0001. Of items that were correctly recalled, a group 9 variable repeated measures ANOVA found that participants reported significantly greater confidence in their memory for words associated with changing compared to stable physiology, F (1, 34) = 5.34, p \ .05, g p 2 = .14. There were no significant differences in confidence ratings between groups, F (1, 34) = .76, p = .39, g p 2 = .02, nor was there a significant group x variable interaction, F (1, 34) = .61, p = .44, g p 2 = .02.
Recognition
For the percentage of hits, a group x variable repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effects for group, F (1, 65) = .002, p = .97, g p 2 \ .0001, variable, F (1, 65) = 1.78, p = .19, g p 2 = .03, nor a significant group x variable interaction, F (1, 65) = 2.10, p = .15, g p 2 = .03. For false alarm rates, the group x variable repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effects for group, F (1, 65) = .13, p = .34, g p 2 = .01, or variable, F (1, 65) = 2.67, p = .11, g p 2 = .04, nor a significant group x variable interaction, F (1, 65) = .19, p = .66, g p 2 = .003. To determine if there were any differences in overall memory accuracy during recognition we also examined d 0 . The group x variable repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for variable, F (1, 65) = 5.05, p \ .05, g p 2 = .07. Participants were more accurate at detecting words associated with changing compared to stable physiology. The main effect of group was not significant, F (1, 65) = .51, p = .48, g p 2 = .008, nor was the group x variable interaction, F (1, 65) = 2.16, p = .15, g p 2 = .03. For response bias, a group x variable repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant, main effects for group, Note: The range of responses for participants was 0-100 * The main effect of group was significant at p \ .05
The main effect of time was significant at p \ .05
Cogn Ther Res (2011) 35:304-316 311 F (1, 65) = .35, p = .56, g p 2 = .005, or variable, F (1, 65) = .15, p = .70, g p 2 = .002, nor a significant group x variable interaction, F (1, 65) = .75, p = .39, g p 2 = .01.
Correlations Between Information Processing. Depression and Anxiety
To examine the relationships between information processing with symptoms of depression, social anxiety, and fear of bodily sensations, correlations between the BDI, SPS, SIAS, and the BSQ with RT during the word task, and percentage of items recognized were calculated. They are presented in Table 4 for each group. There were no significant correlations between these symptom variables and RT to words associated with changing and stable stimuli during the word pronunciation task in the NAC and SAD groups. However, recognition of words associated with changing and stable stimuli were positively correlated with the BSQ among SAD participants, but not NAC participants. The BDI, SPS, and SIAS were unrelated to measures of recognition. To examine if the correlation between the BSQ and the percentage of recognized changing and stable items was significantly larger among SAD than NAC participants rs were transformed to Fisher's Z to test for the significance of differences between independent rs (Glass and Hopkins 1984) . The correlations for SAD participants were significant larger than the correlations for NAC participants for both the correlation between the BSQ and the percentage of hits for stimuli associated with changing physiology, z = 9.03, p \ .001, and stimuli associated with stable physiology, z = 10.60, p \ .001.
Discussion
This study examined whether individuals with SAD exhibit a memory bias for cues they believed indicated changing physiological arousal. Contrary to expectations we did not find that individuals with SAD remembered more words associated with perceived changing physiology compared to a non-anxious control group. We did, however, find that participants, regardless of social anxiety status, were significantly more accurate in recognizing words associated with changing than stable physiology and were significantly more confident in their recall of words associated with changing than stable physiology. That is all participants appeared to show enhanced memory for information that their physiology was changing. (Mattick and Clarke 1998) b Social interaction anxiety scale (Mattick and Clarke 1998) c Beck depression inventory-II (Beck et al. 1996) d Body sensations questionnaire (Chambless et al. 1984) These results suggest that a memory bias for increasing arousal is not specific to social anxiety. Other studies have also found that all participants, regardless of social anxiety level, show enhanced memory for social threat words (Rapee et al. 1994) or affectively valenced words (Cloitre et al. 1995) . One possible explanation for these findings is that processes implicated in social anxiety, such as selffocused attention, are activated in most individuals when anxiety increases in social situations. Consistent with this hypothesis, research has found that overall, individuals, regardless of the level of social anxiety, increase selffocused attention under evaluative conditions (Mellings and Alden 2000) . What may distinguish individuals with SAD from individuals without SAD is the degree and frequency of anxiety experienced. To detect memory biases in SAD, it may be necessary to use a control group reporting minimal levels of social anxiety or to test memory using performance tasks that provoke very minimal anxiety in control participants.
An alternative hypothesis is that individual differences in the type(s) of feared stimuli among SAD participants may determine if memory biases for bodily sensations exist. We found that among SAD participants only, there was a positive correlation between a measure of fear of bodily sensations and the percentage of items associated with changing and stable physiology recognized. The relationship between recognition and fear of body sensations was not apparent among non-anxious participants. That is, SAD participants who tended to report greater fear of bodily sensations also remembered more stimuli associated with their bodily response. Unfortunately as we did not include a test of general memory ability, this interpretation remains tentative as it is not possible to rule out that greater fear of bodily sensations among individuals with SAD results in better memory regardless of the content of the to-be-remembered material. However, this interpretation seems unlikely as there is no clear theoretical reason why high levels of social anxiety in combination with feared body sensations would enhance memory in general. Nonetheless future research should assess general memory when conducting similar studies to rule out this possibility.
These results are largely consistent with findings from Ashbaugh and Radomsky (2009) in that both studies suggest that high levels of social anxiety combined a belief that bodily sensations are important result in memory biases for those sensations. Where the studies diverge is in the type of information remembered by these individuals. In the current study, results suggest that individuals with SAD remember all types feedback about their physiological response during a performance task if they have a high fear of bodily sensations. Ashbaugh and Radomsky (2009) in contrast, found that individuals high in social anxiety and who were told that physiology is important to their performance remembered stimuli associated with increases in their physiological response. These subtle differences in findings may be due to differences in methodology as the current study assessed memory for only two physiological states (changing and stable) and the previous study assessed memory for three physiological states (decreasing, stable, and increasing). It would be interesting to examine in future studies if individuals with SAD who fear their bodily sensations remember specifically increases in their physiological response.
We also found higher correlations between the SPS and the BSQ than the SIAS and the BSQ, particularly among SAD participants. This is consistent with other research suggesting that fear of public speaking, but not fear of social interactions, is associated with fear of bodily sensations and panic-like symptoms (Hofmann et al. 1995; Norton et al. 1997) .
To account for the difficulty in demonstrating memory biases in anxiety, Williams et al. (1997) model of emotion and information processing suggests that anxiety is associated with early pre-attentive information processing biases apparent in attentional tasks followed by avoidance at the voluntary stage of information processing where explicit memory biases are likely to occur. This model, however, is inconsistent with clinical observations that suggest individuals with anxiety often dwell upon fearful situations and models of social anxiety in particular that implicate post-event processing as one of the maintaining factors (Clark and Wells 1995) . Our results, though correlational, point to another possibility consistent with a different approach based on personal significance (see Radomsky and Rachman 2004) . It may be that at later stages of processing individuals selectively elaborate aspects of a social situation they believe are most relevant to their anxiety experiences. Individuals with SAD who fear bodily sensations would be more likely to remember the arousal they experienced during a social situation but may not be more likely to remember information about bored audience members, whereas the opposite may be true for individuals with SAD who report fear of judgment from others but less fear of their bodily sensations. Consistent with this alternative hypothesis regarding anxiety and memory, the few studies that have demonstrated enhanced memory for threat in social anxiety have used personally relevant stimuli (Breck and Smith 1983; Daly et al. 1989; Mellings and Alden 2000; O'Banion and Arkowitz 1977, Smith, et al. 1983) . It is also consistent with research suggesting that memorial biases are likely only to be detected when interpretation biases are examined concurrently (Hertel et al. 2008) . Future research assessing memory using more idiographic approaches is warranted. This is also consistent with findings from Ashbaugh and Radomsky (2009) demonstrating that manipulating the meaning of bodily sensations influences what is remembered during a performance task.
One other interesting finding emerged from this study and warrants discussion. During the encoding task we found that participants with SAD had longer RTs than nonanxious participants for words associated with changing but not stable physiology. It may be that slower response times for stimuli associated with changing physiology observed among SAD participants resemble the slower response of anxious compared to non-anxious participants to the 'emotional Stroop' paradigm (e.g., Lundh and Ö st 1996c) . Results could reflect factors that have also been suggested to affect the emotional Stroop response including cognitive avoidance and inhibition of response due to the emotional reaction elicited by information that one's physiology is changing (Bögels and Mansell 2004) . Previous research has demonstrated that individuals with social anxiety preferentially attend to internal cues of arousal rather than external cues of social threat (Mansell et al. 2003; Pineles and Mineka 2005) . Current results suggest that selective attention may be further refined and directed towards specifically changes in physiological response. As this study was designed as a memory study rather than an attention study, participants were not asked to respond as soon as they detect the location of the word, interpretation of these results needs to be made with caution. Future research examining selective attention for different types of internal cues in social anxiety warrants examination.
Methodologically, this study was one of the few studies to assess memory during a performance task rather than in anticipation of a task. More particularly, this and Ashbaugh and Radomsky (2009) are among the first studies to assess memory for personal internal information using an objective method. The alternative performance task (e.g., the word pronunciation task) in this study was successful in provoking anxiety and resulted in similar changes in anxiety and perceived performance among SAD and NAC participants as standard performance tasks (e.g., Ashbaugh et al. 2005; Ashbaugh and Radomsky 2009; Mellings and Alden 2000) . This new methodology may allow researchers to examine memory and other information processes during anxiety provoking events rather than in anticipation of them as is frequently done (e.g., Mansell et al. 2003 ). However, rates of recall among participants were low ranging from 8.04 to 9.23% and are in a similar range to those found by Ashbaugh and Radomsky (2009) . As in the previous study, these low rates of recall may have prevented us from detecting group or stimulus differences in recall. A task that encourages deeper encoding, such as having participants create sentences with the words, may have increased rates of recall.
In addition to this methodological challenge, a few other limitations should be noted. First, to maintain the believability, ecological validity of the task, and encourage deeper processing of the stimuli of interest, participants were told that changes in physiology results in a greater likelihood to mispronounce words. This may have led participants to pay particular attention to stimuli indicative of physiological change and may account for differences in recognition of stimuli associated with change versus stable physiology, but would not necessarily account for the correlations between recognition of stimuli associated with change and stable physiology and fear of bodily sensations observed among SAD participants. Additionally, though most participants likely interpreted ''changing physiology'' to reflect increasing physiological response, some may have interpretted it to mean decreasing physiological response as well, which could potentially affect how they process the meaning of such changes. These individual differences may have increased variability in results. Replication addressing these limitations is warranted.
Additionally, the SAD group reported higher levels of depression than the NAC group. However, correlations between reaction time, recognition and scores on the BDI-II were non-significant for both the NAC and SAD groups, suggesting that depression may not have played a significant role in determining results. Secondly, our NAC group was comprised of undergraduate students. Though we attempted to reduce potential differences between the two groups by actively recruiting students over the age of 30, a community control group may have been a better comparison group. Future researchers may wish to replicate findings from this study with depression as a further exclusionary criterion and use a community control group to further examine memory for physiological arousal in social anxiety. We also did not include an anxious control group and thus were unable to demonstrate that these findings are specific to SAD. It is possible that individuals with Panic Disorder may also exhibit such a memory bias. However, based upon our interpretation of findings it is not the presence of anxiety and the type of anxiety per se that results in the current findings, but the belief that physiological sensations are important and indicate something negative and are thus personally relevant, combined with the fear of negative consequence (e.g., being evaluated negatively in the case of SAD) that result in the current pattern of findings. Future research should examine the interaction between beliefs concerning not only feared consequences but also about how those consequences are evaluated (e.g., via physiological response in the current study) across a range of anxiety disorders. Finally, control for familywise error rates for the correlational analysis was not possible without substantially reducing the power of the study, though we did attempt to reduce the possibility of making a Type I error by limiting the number of correlations between BSQ and memory to percentage recognized only.
The results of this study suggest that enhanced memory for bodily sensations of arousal may be apparent in some individuals with SAD, specifically those who report elevated fears of those sensations. For these individuals, reappraisal of beliefs about bodily sensations, interoceptive exposure, and attention retraining to reduce self-focus (Wells and Papageorgiou 1998) may be particularly beneficial during cognitive-behavioral treatment. This finding is consistent with recent models of social anxiety that propose it is necessary in studying and providing treatment to individuals with social anxiety disorder to consider not only what social situations are feared, but also what aspects of the situation are most feared by each individual (Moscovitch 2009) . This model and findings from this study both point to the importance of taking an idiographic approach toward feared stimuli in both the research and cognitive-behavioral treatment of SAD.
